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Capital Punishment:
Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross
Violations of Human Rights
By DIANE MARIE AMANN*
I was asked to speak today, to respond to the concept of
corporations' criminal liability for violations of human rights. I am
delighted to do so. I am in the middle of research undoubtedly
incubated during my term as an assistant federal public defender in
that courthouse you see out the window. It asks whether, and in what
circumstances, it is appropriate to launch international or
transnational prosecutions against individual, human defendants-
natural persons.1 The issues with which I have been grappling seem
even more acute when we speak of corporations-artificial persons
or, in French, personnes morales.
Thus, I came to this conference armed with a set of questions.
Would international criminal punishment of corporations serve the
traditional purposes of criminal law in any way? Would it deter?
Would it visit retribution on corporations? How large a fine would
have to be levied to deter a corporation from repeating a crime?
How can you punish an artificial person? You cannot throw a
corporation in jail. There is, in U.S. law at least, the concept of the
corporate death penalty, the termination of the license to do
business But, it is very rarely, if ever, used. What about redressing
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.S., 1979, University of
Illinois; M.A., 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1986, Northwestern
University. These remarks were presented on February 24, 2001, in a panel
concluding a conference entitled "Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible
Under International Law" at Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, California.
Many thanks to Gwen K. Young for research assistance.
1. For an initial consideration of these issues, see Diane Marie Amann,
Assessing International Criminal Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, in THiRD
WORLD LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2001).
2- 12 U.S.C.A. § 93(d) (West Supp. 2000) (forfeiture of franchise of national
banks convicted of money laundering offenses); id., § 1464(w) (same for federal
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victims? If that is really what you want to do, would not other means,
like civil damages or a contribution fund, be much more useful?
And what about the emerging purposes of criminal punishment?
Judges in the international criminal tribunals frequently echo the
U.N. Security Council's contention that international criminal
prosecutions will help to build peace? The link between corporate
criminal responsibility and peace-building did not spring to mind.
What about the expression of moral condemnation? Can a personne
morale have morality that can be condemned?
Then I came to the conference. The first panel, entitled
"Multinationals and the Unfinished Legacy of Nuremberg," provided
more fodder for commentary. In his presentation on corporate
criminal liability, Professor Andrew Clapham suggested embracing a
doctrine advanced by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda as a way to hold corporations responsible.' The tribunal's
1998 judgment in Akayesu spoke in dicta of complicity, a concept
analogous to what is called accomplice liability in the United States.
5
Its articulation of the crime of complicity required proof that the
accomplice knew that he or she was providing assistance to a
principal criminal. The opinion proceeded to quote English, not U.S.,
law, to state that guilt would lie even if the accomplice did not wish
the crime to be committed, and even if the accomplice regretted the
crime that the principal committed.6 On hearing the passage, I
savings associations); id., § 3105 (termination of foreign bank office in United States).
3. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-95-1, Sentencing Judgment, 7 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Nov. 11, 1999), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 117, 120,
available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/trialc2ljudgement/index3.htm (stating that
part of the "unique mandate" that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia received from the U.N. Security Council is "contributing to the
restoration and maintenance of the peace"); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4,
Judgement, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), available at
http:l/www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/Akayesu/judgementlakayOOl.htm (writing that
the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to
"contribute to the process of national reconciliation and the restoration and
maintenance of peace").
4. Some of the ideas Professor Clapham advanced during the conference-
though not this one-were discussed in Andrew Clapham, The Question of
Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons, in LIABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno T.
Kaminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
5. Akayesu, Judgement, 1 525-48, 698-743 (positing elements of complicity, yet
not applying them, as it ruled that conviction of defendant for principal acts of
genocide precluded finding of guilt for complicity to genocide).
6. In full, the passage reads:
[Vol. 24:327
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scrawled on my legal pad, "Can that possibly be just?"
This will be easy, I thought.
But then I looked at the brochure for this conference. Three
images-two distinct, one obscured. Children, with stern faces, and
staring, even glaring, eyes. These faces, I realized, were not going to
let me do this the easy way.
The faces reminded me of other research that I have been doing
this year, regarding Sierra Leone.7 A state whose capital, Freetown,
was known in colonial times as the Athens of West Africa," Sierra
Leone has been wracked for the last ten years by civil war. One-third
of a country about the size of South Carolina is under rebel control.
A quarter of Sierra Leone's 4 million people are refugees or
internally displaced persons. Two harrowing characteristics have
marked the conflict. Children as young as seven or eight routinely
have served in combat. And the civilian population has suffered
incredibly horrific mutilations, rapes and other atrocities.9
The intent or mental element of complicity implies in general that, at the
moment he acted, the accomplice knew of the assistance he was providing in
the commission of the principal offence. In other words, the accomplice
must have acted knowingly.
Moreover, as in all criminal Civil law systems, under Common law,
notably English Law, generally, the accomplice need not even wish that the
principal offence be committed. In the case of National Coal Board v.
Gamble, Justice Devlin stated
"an indifference to the result of the crime does not of itself negate
abetting. If one man deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for
murdering a third, he may be indifferent about whether the third lives or
dies and interested only the cash profit to be made out of the sale, but
he can still be an aider and abettor."
In 1975, the English House of Lords also upheld this definition of complicity,
when it held that willingness to participate in the principal offence did not
have to be established. As a result, anyone who knowing of another's
criminal purpose, voluntarily aids him or her in it, can be convicted of
complicity even though he regretted the outcome of the offence.
Id. [ 538-39 (quoting Nat'l Coal Board v. Gamble, [1959] 1 QB 11) (citations
omitted). For an analysis stating that complicity law differs in California and
elsewhere in the United States, see Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J.
GRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 369,375 (1997).
7. Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a
Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2001); Diane Marie Amann, Medium As Message in Sierra Leone, 7
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249 (2001).
8. GEORGE PADMORE, HoW BRITAIN RULES AFRICA 271 (1936).
9. On these facts, see, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SIERRA LEONE, Feb. 25, 2000, available at
http:/www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/index.cfn?docid=270 (last visited Apr. 21,
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Why is this happening? It is an unusual war. There is not an
ethnic conflict. There is not a religious conflict. There is no
ideological conflict to speak of. There is no popular support for the
rebels.
Well, then, why is all this happening? The answer, to a large
extent, is diamonds.
In the words of one account, "[i]n Sierra Leone, a chaotic
assemblage of rebel and pro-government forces has turned the nation
into a patchwork of armed fiefs competing, essentially, for the
country's diamond riches."' The Revolutionary United Front, the
chief rebel force in Sierra Leone, is allied with President Charles
Taylor of Liberia not only in combat, but also in the illicit diamond
trade. It is in the rebel-controlled areas that Sierra Leone's diamond
mines lie.
Diamond trafficking is incredibly lucrative. Diamonds cannot be
traced. At this point no analysis reveals with certainty whether a
diamond came from a legal mine, in, say, Botswana, or was extracted
by slave laborers in Sierra Leone."
In exchange for these diamonds, Sierra Leonean rebels are
getting arms and mat6riel with which to continue the war: cheap
arms, light enough for seven year olds to carry into combat, and
drugs-crack, methamphetamine, other drugs-strong enough, and
prevalent enough, to incite these children to brutality.3
How does this tragedy relate to the issue of corporate criminal
2001); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COUNTRY REPORTS: SIERRA LEONE, at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/7ebe37766b402ffb380zs68f50061454
4/6ff8783fea50d6fc802568f200552966!OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 21, 2001).
10. Alan Cowell, Colonialism's Legacy Becomes a Burden, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2000, § 4, at 5.
11. Blaine Harden, Africa's Gems: Warfare's Best Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2000, at Al.
12. See generally Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1195 (2000), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/panelreport.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2001) [hereinafter U.N. Experts'
Report].
13. On these facts, see, e.g., Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, in AFRICAN GUERRILLAS 172, 180, 190
(Christopher Clapham ed., 1998) (discussing the use of drugs to embolden Sierra
Leone's child soldiers); Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert
of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graga Machel, Submitted Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 48/157, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108 27, 47, U.N. Doc.
A/51/306 (1996) (discussing how administration of drugs and ready availability of
lightweight arms promotes child soldiering).
[Vol. 24:327
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liability?
There is a 1999 report circulating on the Internet from David
Pratt, a Member of the Canadian Parliament and Special Envoy to
Sierra Leone, to Lloyd Axworthy, then foreign minister of Canada.14
Pratt described the multimillion-dollar diamond trade and arms sales
from Liberia as "vital pillars of support for rebel forces in Sierra
Leone."15  The Sierra Leone mines are run by what Pratt called
"shadowy companies" believed to employ private security firms that
thwart government efforts at control.6  Pratt's account and others
outline components of this commercial enterprise; they include
diamond markets in Beirut, Antwerp and New York, and arms
dealers in Eastern Europe, Libya and Liberia. 7 A shadowy industry
with the means to create havoc in Sierra Leone. In Liberia and
Congo too, the story is not much different. 8
Thinking about diamonds made me think seriously about trying
to call corporations to account, by means of transnational or
international criminal law, for behavior that can only be characterized
as criminal.
There is precedent for it. As Professor Clapham explained, the
first Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
included declarations that certain organizations were criminal. These
included the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, as well as various
Nazi security forces.'9 Though no corporations were convicted in that
14. David Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, Report to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P. from David Pratt, M.P.
Nepean-Carlton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/pratt042399.html (Apr. 23, 1999).
15. Id. pt. 2. A 2000 U.N. report estimates the RUF diamond traffic to be
between $25 million and $125 million a year, "more than enough to sustain its
military effort." U.N. Experts' Report, supra note 12, 80.
16. Pratt, supra note 14, pt. 2.
17. Id. (mentioning links -with West Africans of Lebanese descent and to
diamond markets in Beirut, as well as arms dealing through regions described in
text); Harden, supra note 11 (stating that "[ejight out of 10 of the world's rough
diamonds... pass through Antwerp's Diamond Center," and that "[m]any diamond
traders in Antwerp do not particularly want to know where the stones came from").
18. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, In Ruined Liberia, Its Despoiler Sits Pretty, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at Al (describing how President Taylor has used diamonds to
fuel war in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa and, at the same time, has
"plundered his country's natural resources"); Donald G. McNeil Jr., A War Turned
Free-for-All Tears at Africa's Center, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1998, § 4, at 5 (describing
how greed for diamonds and other natural resources prolongs war in Congo).
19. See United States v. Goering, Judgment (Int'l Mil. Trib. Sept. 30, 1946),
reprinted in 6 F.R.D. 69, 135-36, 139, 143 (1946) (declaring criminal the Leadership
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or in subsequent judgments, these declarations nonetheless
established that artificial persons could be guilty of international
crime.'
In the United States, holding corporations criminally liable is
unremarkable. Particularly in the area of money laundering, it is not
at all unusual for a corporation to endure criminal process.2'
As Professor Ugo Mattei mentioned in the course of this
conference, even in civil law states there is movement in this
direction. A recent French law, for example, allows corporate
criminal responsibility.' Within Europe as a whole, though hesitation
remains, there is agitation in this area.' Out of last December's
Corps; the Geheime Staatspolizei, or Gestapo; the Sicherheitsdienst des ReichsfJhrer
SS, or SD; and the Schutzstaffeln, or SS).
20. See Clapham, supra note 4, at 165. Industrialists were, of course, convicted in
postwar trials. Id. at 166-67 (discussing conviction of directors of I.G. Farben
company for international crimes including use of slave labor and production of
poisonous gas). Prosecution of human beings engaged in illegal commercial activity
well may serve deterrence, incapacitation, and other justifications for criminal
punishment. That question is beyond the scope of this paper, which considers only
prosecution of corporations, artificial persons.
21. United States v. Banque Leu, S.A., No. CR-93-0607 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 1993)
(plea of guilty to money laundering), discussed in Kirk W. Munroe, Surviving the
Solution: The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 505, 520-
21 (1996). See also Don Van Natta Jr., U.S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in
Laundering of Drug Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6 (reporting on sting
operation in which three Mexican banks were charged with money laundering). Just
days after these remarks were delivered, a Chinese company that made binder clips
sold in the United States was convicted of violating a 1932 federal law proscribing
importation of products made with prison or forced labor. William K. Rashbaum,
Chinese Firm Pleads Guilty in Labor Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at B1. Cf
Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and Punishment in France:
Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes Morales) under the New French
Criminal Code (Nouveau Code P6nal), 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 111, 117-20 (1995)
(discussing development of "American model of corporate criminal responsibility").
22. C. PtN. art. 121-22 (extending criminal liability to corporations in the 1990s
revision of French Penal Code). Permissible punishment includes measures such as
closing of business and limitations on activities, to fines of up to five times that
allowed for natural persons. Id., arts. 132-12, 132-38, 131-39; see generally Orland &
Cachera, supra note 21 (discussing these laws).
23. Clapham, supra note 4, at 175-78 (discussing European measures); Roland
Hefendehl, Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code Section 2.07 and the
Development in Western Legal Systems, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 283, 284 (2000)
(writing of "widespread reluctance to accept this idea in continental Europe," yet
noting that France, Denmark, and Sweden had already established corporate
criminal liability, and that some commentators had called for similar innovation in
Germany). In Japan, two weeks after this presentation, a subsidiary of Credit Suisse
was found guilty of securities violations, "the first criminal conviction of a bank in
memory." Miki Tanikawa, Japanese Court Convicts a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
[Vol. 24:327
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Palermo conference on organized crime came a multilateral
convention that calls upon states parties to adopt measures to hold
corporations criminally liable. '
Criminal prosecution of industries engaged in the business of war
thus deserves serious and full consideration.
What would be the advantage? Authorizing corporate criminal
liability would bring the repressive power of a state, or perhaps a
collection of states, to the table. Thus, investigation and prosecution
would be pursued by an organized body-a governmental entity-
with power that may equal or exceed that of the suspect corporation.
Governmental entities, moreover, may make use of otherwise
unavailable intelligence and classified information.
The benefit itself raises concerns. Government criminal
prosecution well may become a test case for civil litigation seeking
damages. Think about the Lockerbie trial that just ended. After
more than a decade of international litigation and negotiation over
how to adjudicate the bombing of a Pan Am airliner, two Libyans
stood trial at an abandoned military base in the Netherlands, before a
panel of Scottish judges applying Scottish law. One was convicted,
the other acquitted. How did the relatives of Lockerbie victims
react? "Well," some said in essence, "we're not delighted with the
verdict. But the criminal case gave us access to lots of new
information. Now we've made our case for the civil litigation, to
recover damages." '' Should a government act as a stalking horse for
civil litigation?
Will individual states have the courage to take on corporations in
this way? Think about what is happening here in the United States.
Neither the U.S. government nor the State of California has pursued
Chevron or Unocal for alleged overseas human rights abuses.
2001, at W1.
24. U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 105, art. 10, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/551383 (2000) (setting forth
obligations regarding "[l]iability of legal persons"), available at
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/fnal_documents_2/convention
_eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2001); Gunther Kern, More Than 100 Nations Back
Cross-Border Anti-Crime Treaty, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 15, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 24782064 (stating that 121 states signed the treaty during Palermo
conference).
25. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in '88 Pan Am
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al (stating that victims' relatives seemed
"satisfied," noting that the verdict "would help their civil case against Libya");
Donald G. McNeil Jr., Verdict's Reasoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,2001, at Al (quoting
attorney for plaintiffs on how Scottish criminal court's findings would aid civil case).
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Instead, that is being done by individual plaintiffs via suits invoking
the Alien Tort Claims Act.26  States rejected a proposal to include
corporate criminal liability in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.2 In Sierra Leone, there is movement toward
establishment of a mixed national-international tribunal, a Special
Court. But the draft statute provides only for punishment of natural
persons,' and then only to those few persons suspected of bearing
"the greatest responsibility" for atrocities.29 Can we expect aggressive
pursuit of corporations by states or international organizations?
Think too about how international criminal prosecution of
corporations would affect litigation. Making corporations litigants
would make criminal trials longer and more expensive. Corporate
defendants in international criminal cases, no less than corporate
defendants in U.S. Alien Tort cases, will push for rulings leading to
more pro-defense doctrines." From the perspective of one who
believes there should be more attention to the rights of the accused in
26. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (describing suit
seeking redress under this act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, based on plaintiff
villagers' allegations that California-based corporate defendant, through government
security forces, engaged in relocation of villages, enslavement, and property theft in
Burma); Jason Hoppin, Chevron Hit with Human Rights Claim, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 24,
2000, at B1 (reporting on lawsuit filed in San Francisco by Nigerian citizens,
complaining of human rights violations at defendant's Nigerian operation).
27. Clapham, supra note 4, at 143-60 (detailing negotiation process that led to
this rejection and suggesting that statute could eventually be amended to include
such liability).
28. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 19 (requiring
conviction be punished by "imprisonment") [hereinafter Special Court Statute], in
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., Enclosure, at 28, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/docs/s2000915.pdf (Oct. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter Secretary-General's Report].
29. Amendment to Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in Letter dated
22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the
Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, 52d sess., Annex, art. 1(1), at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/1234 (2000), available -at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2000/1234e.pdf
[hereinafter Security Council Letter]. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had
proposed that the Special Court be permitted to adjudicate a broader group-not just
leaders, but anyone suspected of being "most responsible" for serious violations. See
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 28, 29-30, at 6-7; Special Court Statute,
supra note 28, art. 1, at 15. The U.N. Security Council insisted on the narrower
formulation. See Security Council Letter, supra, 1, at 1.
30. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1999)
(affirming dismissal of suit in which Indonesian citizen had alleged that a Louisiana
mining corporation was liable for international human rights violations and
genocide).
[Vol. 24:327
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the international arena, this may be a good thing. Yet some rulings,
like the holding in Unocal setting a high threshold for liability of
private actors, might constrain the scope of the law unduly.3' Thus
blameworthy defendants, human beings as well as corporations, could
escape criminal punishment.
There remains, always, the question of punishment. What, short
of closing the business, would give a corporation its just deserts?
Today, human defendants convicted of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide routinely receive sentences ranging from
twenty years to life in prison.' Can a money-based penalty, such as a
fine or disgorgement of assets, approximate prolonged incarceration?
Indeed, monetary penalties levied against corporations in criminal
cases in the United States often seem trifling.33
There is also the matter of moral condemnation. From
31. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting
motion for summary judgment on ground that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that
corporate defendant's actions met this threshold).
32. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgement, 3-11, 862-
82 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Feb. 22, 2001), available at
http:llwww.un.orglicty/focaltrialc2/judgementlindex.htm (sentencing three Bosnian
Serb military and paramilitary officials, in case involving rape, slavery, and torture of
civilians, to twenty-eight, twenty, and twelve years respectively); Prosecutor v.
Musema, No. ICrR-96-13, Judgement and Sentence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHlcases/Musema/judgement/index.htm (setting penalty
of life in prison for former state-owned factory director guilty of three counts of
genocide and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, Sentencing
Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugo. Nov. 11, 1999), reprinted in 39
I.L.M. 117, 120, available at
http:l/www.un.orglictyltadicltrialc2/udgementindex_3.htm (sentencing defendant for
various amounts of time for multiple counts, to be served concurrently, so that
imprisonment will span twenty-five years); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4,
Sentence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 2, 1998), available at
http:lwww.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesuljudgementlak8lOO2e.html (sentencing
former mayor convicted of genocide and other crimes to three life sentences plus
eighty years incarceration).
33. The amounts in money laundering cases seem high, but pale in comparison to
overall criminal activity. For example, two Mexican banks forfeited $13 million after
pleading guilty to money laundering. Asset Forfeiture: Hearing before the Senate
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight, Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of James E. Johnson, Treasury Undersecretary (Enforcement)), available
at 1999 WL 20010422. The illegal funds processed, however, were estimated at much
more. David Rosenzweig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexican Banks Indicted in Drug
Money Probe, L.A. TIMEs, May 19, 1998, at Al (referring to $115 million in illegal
money). In another case, a company that pleaded guilty to forcing Chinese prisoners
to assemble thousands of binder clips a day, though their fingers were bleeding,
agreed to pay a $50,000 fine as its sentence. Rashbaum, supra note 21.
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Nuremberg to today, international criminal tribunals have placed
great weight on their power to denounce and to express the outrage
of the international community. The International Military Tribunal
consciously established a record of atrocities and made declarations
of culpability.' Likewise, in 1996, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia wrote that it "sees public
reprobation and stigmatisation by the international community, which
would thereby express its indignation over heinous crimes and
denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential functions of a
prison sentence...."35 This expressive component of international
adjudication can only be effective if the judgment is solemn and the
sentence weighty. Conviction of a corporation for a heinous crime,
coupled with a monetary penalty, may not suffice. Despite the
moniker personne morale, a corporation has no morality. I fear that
attachment of the label "criminal" to such an entity will dilute the
expressive force of international criminal law.
So where does that leave me?
Greed is at the heart of some of the world's worst tragedies.
Corporations are being used as instrumentalities for great and
unimaginable suffering. In such cases, I believe it is appropriate to
impose criminal liability on corporations. To do so, under the right
conditions, could indeed assist in bringing peace to war-torn regions.
It is essential that the standards of knowledge and intent to
which corporate defendants are held satisfy strict penal standards.
Criminal conviction for what approaches a crime of association ought
to be avoided. The Akayesu complicity standard may have value in
civil litigation against corporations, but in the criminal context that
standard invites doubt about the fairness of conviction even of an
individual, sentient human being. These concerns increase in the
context of a collective, artificially intelligent being.
Furthermore, corporate criminal culpability should be pursued
34. See, e.g., United States v. Goering, Judgment (Int'l MI. Trib. Sept. 30, 1946),
reprinted in 6 F.R.D. 69, 82 (1946) (stating that an event, later held to fall outside the
Tribunal's jurisdiction, "must not be forgotten"); id. at 126 (writing that evidence of
Nazi persecution of Jews comprises "record of consistent and systematic inhumanity
on the greatest scale"); id. at 132 (noting consequences of its power to "declare"
certain groups criminal); id. at 147 (stating that it "must" describe the "shocking"
behavior of members of the Nazi General Staff and High Command, even as it
declares the group not to be criminal).
35. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22, Sentencing Judgement, 65 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Nov. 29, 1996), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgement/erd-tsj961129e.htm.
[Vol. 24:327
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only in the worst cases. For the grossest, most systematic violations of
human rights. For the business of war, for the Sierra Leones.
Perhaps not for many of the Alien Tort cases we have heard about in
the course of this conference.
And what about punishment? I never thought I would hear
myself advocate the death penalty. But the offenses I have outlined
cause unforgivable suffering. Only total dissolution of the
corporation-capital punishment-is appropriate.
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